Let us look at a number of similar objects, say a group of five apples. We observe that the relation of the number five to the group of objects in front of us is purely external and accidental. In applying to it the conception ‘five’ we combine the single objects into a group and give it a name, or numerical label, which has nothing to do with the nature of the items making up the group. This way of thinking, we may observe, is of exactly the kind which the nominalists of the Middle Ages attributed to every conception formed by the human mind. In fact, the process of counting is a process of pure abstraction. The more differentiated are the things which we want to combine into a group through the process of counting, the further this abstraction has to go. We can count apples and pears together under the collective conception of ‘fruit’; if turnips are added, we must help ourselves out with the conception ‘vegetable products’; until finally we deal only with ‘things’, without considering any qualitative differentiation. Thus the conception of number is created solely within the human mind, which applies it to things from outside.